Islamic State Military Official Describes Running a Guerrilla War Out of the Syrian Desert
Islamic State Military Official Describes Running a Guerrilla War Out of the Syrian Desert
The use of the deserts by the Islamic State (IS) as strategic depth to recover and rebuild during times of hardship, when they have been pushed from (overt) control of territory back into insurgency mode, is well-established. IS took this lesson from the 2007-08 period, allowing it to recover to a level where it could declare its “caliphate” in 2014, and the lesson was being applied even before the final destruction of the caliphate in March 2019. IS’s operatives regularly spoke of a “departure/retreat into the desert” (inhiyaz ila al-sahra). IS has mentioned these rural sanctuaries as vital parts of its ability to recover in longer strategy documents, in the speeches of its leaders (here, here, here, here), and regularly in its weekly newsletter Al-Naba (here, here, here, here, here, here).
A new contribution on this theme is to be found in the 349th edition of Al-Naba, published on 28 July 2022: an interview with an IS “military official” (al-masul al-askari) based in the Badiya, the desert region of eastern Syria.
The Naba questioner asks first for a “brief introductory overview of the Badiya region and its terrain”, and those involved in fighting IS there.
The IS official defines the Badiya as extending “across vast areas in … Homs, Palmyra, Hama, [Deir Ezzor], Raqqa, and others”: “The geographical nature of the Badiya varies from one region to another. Some of them are barren desert and sand dunes; some are flat open plains; and some of them are [dominated by] hills (al-tilal) that descend into valleys. There are [also] rugged mountains (al-jabal al-wa’ra) … All of them share the same harsh (qasiya) climatic environment and rugged terrain.”
The IS official describes the enemies in the Badiya as “the apostate Nusayri army”—“Nusayri” being a reference to Alawis, the dominant sect in the regime of Bashar al-Asad—and its “auxiliary militias”, such as Liwa al-Quds (The Jerusalem Brigade), a mostly Palestinian unit, as well as some tribal militias, all supported by Russia and Iran.
The second question is: “You mentioned … the rugged geographical nature of the desert, so how did the soldiers of the caliphate adapt to that harsh environment?”
The IS official is short on practicalities when it comes to the endurance of the jihadists in the Syrian desert, attributing their “steadfastness” amid the scorching heat and cruel cold, including snows in the winter, to their determination to “ensure the continuity of jihad, relying on God alone”. IS is “spread across large areas” of the Badiya and they “carry the message of their Prophet Muhammad”, which is apparently enough to see them through the torments of the conditions.
The third question is about how IS operatives spend their time in the deserts, and what programs are laid on for the jihadists.
Here, the IS official gets much more interesting. “The mujahid spends his daily life in the desert moving between religious preparation, physical preparation, and military preparation”, the IS official says. IS operatives cycle between ribat (patrolling the frontiers of these communes), making booby traps and explosive vests (for suicide bombers), reconnaissance of the patrols of the Asad/Iran regime, and—when necessary—fending off enemy incursions.
The military situation and the harshness of the conditions make it difficult to gather for religious instruction, the official says, but “you will hardly find a group of mujahideen in the desert” who do not make time for such worship and memorisation of the Qur’an and Hadith is a major way that time is used by the IS cells in the Badiya.
The IS official is next asked to expand on the specifics of the military situation: what IS does, and what it faces, after years in the deserts.
In the most notable answer in the interview, the IS official says that, since “vast areas of the desert have fallen into the hands of the mujahideen, they attack the enemy at times and in the manner of their choosing”:
As for the nature of the operations launched by the mujahideen, it varies between smaller ambushes and armed raids on the enemy columns and gatherings as they cross the desert, especially the buses transporting soldiers, and lightning strikes and bold attacks on its military checkpoints and positions, as well as the IED weapon, which plays a major role in targeting the enemy’s mobile and foot patrols.
Also among the most prominent operational methods is to launch simultaneous attacks against enemy targets across large and sprawling spaces, with the aim of dispersing the enemy forces and depleting [or attriting; istinzaf] their military and logistical capabilities across the valleys of several regions, which contributes greatly to the destruction of morale among enemy soldiers, who are exhausted by [the need to be on] constant alert, and [the demands of being] spread over such vast areas searching for the mujahideen groups that hit them and then disappear quickly.
The reconnaissance and counter-intelligence activities of the IS jihadists also allow them to assassinate “leaders and prominent officers of the Russian and Nusayri armies”, and to root out spies who try to give away their positions to the regime coalition.
The Naba questioner asks the IS official about the scale of the attacks from the deserts.
The IS official confirms that there have been attacks on the pro-Asad coalition’s forces in the Badiya, but “there is also a lot of exaggeration” and some outright “fake news” (al-akhbar al-muzayaf), which the IS official attributes to the “apostate Awakening”. It is unclear exactly which group is being referred to but from context—the IS official says their “malicious intentions” include “attracting Crusader support”—he seems to be referring to the U.S.-supported rebels of the Jaysh Maghawir al-Thawra (Revolutionary Commando Army) in the pocket around the Tanf base. For this reason, the IS official implores the group’s supporters at outlets like Fursan al-Balagh Media not to amplify online rumours and to be satisfied only with official IS pronouncements, because “the raging media war is no less dangerous than the military war”.
[It should be noted IS in the Badiya has at times wilfully downplayed its activities. There is some evidence, admittedly by inference, that this is still happening: in Al-Naba over the late spring and summer, there have been weeks where IS reported no operations in Syria, which seems most unlikely.]
In terms of what IS has done in the Badiya, over four months this year—Jumada al-Akhirah (Jan. 4–Feb. 1), Sha’ban (Mar. 4–Apr. 1), Dhul Qadah (May 31–June 29), and Dhul Hijjah (June 30–July 29)—the IS official says IS carried out twenty attacks that killed and wounded “about” ninety soldiers from the regime coalition, and destroyed fifteen of their military vehicles. These attacks were spread over the towns of: Sukhna in Homs province; Salamiya (the mostly Ismaili town) in Hama province; and Duwayr, Shula and Kashma in “Al-Khayr” (i.e. Deir Ezzor province).
Question six is: “The enemy has launched dozens of military campaigns against the mujahideen in the desert. What was their result? What is your response to Russia’s repeated declarations that hundreds of mujahideen were killed during these campaigns?”
The IS official concedes that “the infidels have launched many campaigns against the mujahideen in the Badiya”, and these have included a large number of soldiers, including the “recent” ones where the ranks of the enemy were filled out with tribal militias and Russian troops, plus “intense, barbaric” Russian airstrikes in support of the regime coalition’s ground forces. “[D]espite the enormity and fierceness of these campaigns”, says the IS official, “most of these campaigns failed, thanks to God Almighty and His help to His mujahideen slaves, who were only made more determined by these campaigns to continue al-tariq [the path].”
The Russian claims about the casualties it has inflicted on IS—which have always been dubious in Syria—are dismissed brusquely by the IS official: “As for what the Russians say about the killing of hundreds of mujahideen during these campaigns, they are just like all the other infidel armies: there is no limit to the lies in their figures and statements regarding their war against the soldiers of the caliphate. If they kill a mujahid, they announce the killing of hundreds! And if they target a vehicle or bomb a mujahideen position, they say, ‘We destroyed dozens of vehicles and headquarters’!”
Question seven is about the anti-IS forces relying on airpower—why that is and how the jihadists have coped “under a sky full of planes”?
The IS official replies:
In recent times, the enemy has been launching its drones continuously in the skies over the Badiya, sending helicopters and warplanes to sweep [the area] and launch random raids … with the aim of restricting the mujahideen and limiting their movements. However, the mujahideen were able … to adapt to this situation and hide from the enemy planes, and often even to move under them. Despite the vastness of the area in which the mujahideen are deployed throughout the desert, they have succeeded in disguising their positions … [A]ll this is thanks to God … and also to the field experience that the mujahideen have gained in dealing with these planes over the past years.
Al-Naba has previously written about IS adapting to the air campaign against it, in September 2017.
The penultimate question is: “Did the mujahideen in the desert succeed in the war of attrition (harb al-istinzaf) that they declared against the enemy forces, according to the plan they formulated and the goals they set?”
“Yes, by the grace of God alone, the plan of the mujahideen succeeded in achieving its goals of attrition (istinzaf) and exhaustion (inhak) of the armies of infidelity and apostasy throughout the Badiya, and this is demonstrated by the continuation of attacks, explosions, and ambushes that inflict great losses in lives and equipment on the enemy, not the least of which is the documented attack [on 20 June] against the Nusayri army bus”, says the IS military official, who adds that, “as part of the war of attrition”, attacks have been stepped up on oil tankers belonging to “the Qaterji militia”, and this—along with the casualties inflicted by IS, and the expense of the continuous regime bombing raids—has contributed greatly to the “economic and military attrition of the enemy”.
The ninth and final question from the Naba interviewer is a softball about the IS official’s “advice” for “Muslims around the world” who are apparently “eagerly” wanting to follow news of, and join in, the jihad of IS’s operatives in the Syrian deserts.
The IS official begins with a lot of theology. Jihad is declared to be “one of the greatest acts of worship” and God is said to have “made this clear in many places”, some of which are then listed, with the inducement added that living by Islam’s codes leads to a great reward.
Finally getting to the point, the IS official says that those who can get to Syria to join IS should do so, though he knows this is difficult at the present time. If getting to Syria proves impossible, there are still “the rest of the wilayats of the Islamic State” that can be travelled to—a reiteration of IS’s call six weeks before this interview for foreign fighters to consider Africa as a destination, the first time hijra (emigration) had been encouraged to anywhere but the Centre (Iraq and Syria).
If travel to the IS wilayats is blocked, the IS official goes on, “roll up your sleeves, and do what you can for your religion” at home: “the conditions for legitimate jihad are today present in all Muslim countries”, which are under the rule of governments that use man-made laws rather than the shari’a and are “loyal to the Jews and Christians, so be the source of the spark, and … a good example for those who follow after you; ignite the flame of jihad in the cause of God wherever you are”.