Some Potential Clarity on U.S. Policy in Syria and Ukraine, For Better or Worse (Mostly Worse)
Anything written about geopolitics while Donald Trump is World Emperor runs the risk of being out of date soon after it is published, if not before. Trump changes what passes for his mind from day to day, and even when decisions are reached he can be easily distracted from implementation, often by a crisis one of his other brainwaves has caused. That caveat in place, there are signs of U.S. policy, if it may be so called, crystalising over Syria and Ukraine.
Syria is the easier case to discern. I wrote here at the end of March that all indicators were Trump was preparing to withdraw from Syria, perhaps as soon as May. In fairness to Trump, this is something he has wanted to do for a decade and tried three times to do last time. On each occasion, Trump was argued out of it by responsible officials who understood the potential negative consequences. That factor has been eliminated this time. The reports over the last few days suggest Trump has ordered the 2,000 troops in Syria to be drastically reduced, perhaps halved, within two months. The military logic for total withdrawal alone begins to take over with a force that small. Moreover, it seems Trump’s trip to Saudi Arabia in May will include a meeting with Syria’s “interim” president, Ahmad al-Shara: it is the kind of photo op Trump loves, and if Trump takes the chance to emphatically celebrate ending a “forever war”, this administration’s officials will hasten to make it a reality, rather than trying to find the least embarrassing way to walk it back.
Ukraine is murkier, though only in the details. The direction of travel is not in much doubt.
The interview General Keith Kellogg, the official United States Special Envoy for Ukraine, gave to the London Times on 11 April attracted attention because he explained his vision of a peace agreement for Ukraine as a de facto partition “almost … like what happened with Berlin after World War Two”, with British and French troops deployed in western Ukraine as a “reassurance force”, and the Russians occupying the east.
Analogising a settlement for democratic Ukraine after it has been invaded and Nazi Germany after its defeat was tactless, given that among Russia’s justifications for trying to conquer Ukraine is so it can “de-Nazify” the country, and it was all the worse for being made during the preparations to mark the eightieth anniversary of Victory in Europe Day in the Second World War. But this diplomatic faux pas was the least of it.
Kellogg’s plan on its own terms undermined Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s official position that all Russian-occupied territories must be vacated—essentially giving away for free what Moscow would otherwise have had to pay for in negotiations. Worse, Kellogg said he expected elections in Ukraine soon after a ceasefire, and, though he caveated it by saying it was ultimately “a call for the Ukrainian people”, it was an unmistakeable tilt towards a key demand of Russian ruler Vladimir Putin, who hopes setting Ukrainians against each other in an election will weaken and destabilise the country—and remove Zelensky, the man who has done so much to thwart his designs so far.
Kellogg’s statement that no American troops would be involved in a Ukraine settlement appears to confirm that British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has been wasting his time in trying to mediate between Trump and the rest of NATO. Starmer has been adamant that an American tripwire force is required in Ukraine to prevent “peace” being merely—as the Minsk deals were—an interval for Russia to rest and recover before invading again.
Kellogg’s subsequent claim to have been misrepresented over “partitioning” Ukraine was lexicographical hair-splitting, and in any case none of this matters because Kellogg does not matter. The real story on 11 April was a few hours later when Trump’s personal envoy, Steve Witkoff, was photographed shaking hands with Putin in Saint Petersburg. Witkoff has been coordinating a direct line between Trump and Putin that goes over not only Kellogg’s head, but Zelensky’s—and Britain’s and Europe’s, if it comes to that.
Witkoff said on Fox News after his meeting with Putin that the “five territories” Russia occupies and claims it has “annexed”—four provinces in eastern Ukraine and Crimea—are the key to “a permanent peace”, and he thought Putin was now on board for a deal. As well he may be on Witkoff’s terms: Witkoff said publicly last month that these areas are “Russian territories”.
President Zelensky clearly recognised the drift of things. At a public event on 15 April, standing alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Odessa, Zelensky said: “For us, it is a red line to recognise any temporarily occupied territories as Russian. Those representatives mentioned are discussing issues beyond their competence.”
Trump himself, in the meantime, had weighed in. On 13 April, a Russian missile attack massacred Christian worshippers in Sumy, northern Ukraine, as they went to church on Palm Sunday. Trump responded by saying he had been “told” (by whom?) Moscow “made a mistake” and then blocked a G7 statement condemning the crime. The next day, Trump made two separate statements that (yet again) blamed Zelensky for starting the war. Trump’s Vice President, J.D. Vance, added on 15 April that “you have to try to understand” the Russian perspective, and suggested an equivalence between Moscow’s purposes and “what the Ukrainians are trying to get out of the conflict”.
Trump views geopolitics solely “through the prism of his personal relations”. For conspiratorial reasons dating back many years, Trump personally dislikes Zelensky, and this has been compounded because, while Zelensky has made an effort to improve relations, he has shown there are limits to how far he will play the flattery game with Trump. Zelensky drew the line at Trump lying about his country and insulting its national honour, something no other world leader has yet done. On the other hand, Trump believes Putin is his friend, and Putin encourages the belief.
The current trajectory points to Trump and Putin making a deal via Witkoff, who has internalised the Russian view of Ukraine and also openly admires Putin personally. The deal would have to be on favourable terms to Putin, since he retains his maximalism concerning Ukraine’s sovereignty. Zelensky would likely reject such a deal and Trump will then blame Kyiv for being opposed to “peace,” resulting in the hardening of the already-nascent realignment that pits the United States and Russia against Ukraine, Britain, and Europe.