
Yuri Tabak, who worked as an economist in the Soviet Union in its last decade or so, took up writing on religious issues after the Communist Empire was gone and made a particular study of the Jewish-Christian relationship. Tabak contributes to the Council of Jewish-Christian Relations (CJCR) and in 2000 wrote an article there about the Russian Orthodox Church’s ideological and practical approach to Russia’s Jews over the 500 or so years of its existence, which is reproduced below.
Tabak’s subject is a rich one and he covers a lot of ground, but the article is particularly interesting because of the moment when he wrote it. It gives a picture of the Russian political scene at the turn of the millennium, when liberals were still active in public and there were the lineaments of a Russian civil society, alongside the militant Christian Orthodox and fascistic elements that had emerged from the rubble of the Soviet Revolution. There is another aspect. Russia’s 1990s was turbulent and for many miserable in wake of the Soviet collapse, and yet, simultaneously, Russia had begun a process of democratic reform. When Vladimir Putin officially took over the Russian presidency on New Year’s Eve 1999, it was probably already too late to prevent Russia relapsing into authoritarianism, but that would not become clear for several more years. As such, Tabak writes as if the road to further democratic evolution in Russia is open. It is an almost vertiginous experience to be transported back to a time when a liberal Russian could be optimistic about his country’s future.
I found an English translation of Tabak’s article on the CJCR website, but it quickly became clear that, in addition to more minor issues with grammar and punctuation, it was quite a loose translation. Checking the original Russian version, one can see that the CJCR translation somewhat distorts Tabak’s emphasis in places—starting with the title (given as “Relations Between the Russian Orthodox Church and Judaism: Past and Present”)—and for some reason (there’s no pattern to it) parts of the article are omitted in the translation. There are also a couple of outright errors. A Russian friend helped me work through it to make the editions and corrections. Some bits of clarification and/or context are added in square brackets. The subheadings are not in Tabak’s original paper; they have been added here just to break it up.
The Attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church Towards the Jews: In History and Modernity
[Отношение Русской Православной Церкви к евреям: история и современность]
By Yuri Tabak
2000
DEFINING TERMS
Before we begin elucidating the stated topic, it seems necessary to clarify meanings. Intuitively, the reader will sense that we are going to discuss the attitude of the predominant and most historically influential faith in Russia—Orthodoxy—towards the representatives of another religion—Judaism [Iudaizma].1 For many centuries the terms “Evrei” and “Iudei” have been interchangeable [words for “Jew”], however, due to specific developments in Jewish consciousness in recent centuries, the ethnic and religious components of Jewry have acquired separate meanings.
Secularised Jews have broken away from the religious community, without, however, losing their cultural and ethnic identity. Generally, secular Jewry, despite declaring its irreligiosity, continues to see a tremendous humanistic significance in traditional Jewish religious values.2 In this sense, the definition of “Iudei”, conventionally applied in Russia to a Jew who professes Judaism, narrows too far the polysemantic concept of “Jewry” [Evreistvo] as it is perceived by a modern Orthodox Christian.
Moreover, the very meaning of the word “Iudei”, taken in its historical and religious context, is quite polysemantic [or ambiguous] and contradictory.3 For this reason, we prefer to use the wider term “Evrei”, even though this term retains a whole series of difficulties when considering the complexities of Judeo-Christian relations.4
Furthermore, before analysing contemporary attitudes of the Russian Orthodox Church to Jews and Judaism, it is necessary to examine the religious and historical circumstances that have determined the current situation.
The position of the Jewish community in Orthodox Russia is the subject of an extensive academic literature, and it is not necessary for our purposes to analyse it in detail.5 Nevertheless, let us try to outline the general trends in the relationship between Jews and Orthodox Christians in Russia over more than a thousand years.
THE ORIGINS OF THE JEWISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP
The Jewish-Orthodox relationship dates back virtually to the beginning of Russian statehood. Already in the ninth and tenth centuries, Jews from Western Europe and Khazars professing Judaism settled on the territory of the Kievan Rus. The Jewish community appears to have occupied a fairly strong economic and social position: Kievan Jews studied in the famous Jewish educational institutions of Europe, and Kiev was a leading centre of trade between East and West, which was mainly carried out by Jews and Italians.6
The influence of Judaism in the Rus was also apparently significant: it is no accident that the famous “Tale of Bygone Years” includes a story about how Prince Vladimir chose the future monotheistic State religion to replace old pagan beliefs—and one of the alternatives was Judaism. Although the question of the provenance and historical reliability of the “Tale” remain unresolved,7 it is an undeniable fact that in the Kievan Rus, even at this early stage, there were sharp polemics between Christians and Jews. There are strong anti-Jewish passages in the “Philosopher’s Discourse” [“Речи философа”] contained in the “Tale” [which testify to this].
[For reasons unclear, Tabak refers to “the famous ‘Tale of the Baptism of the Rus’ [‘Сказание о крещении Руси’]”, but he obviously means the “Tale of Bygone Years” [“Повесть Временных Лет”] or the “Primary Chronicle” because: (1) there is no such book as “Tale of the Baptism of the Rus”; (2) the “famous” record of Russia’s origins is the “Tale of Bygone Years”; and (3) his references to the contents of the book are things in the “Tale of Bygone Years”. It is in the “Tale of Bygone Years” we get the story of “Vladimir the Great” choosing Orthodox/Byzantine Christianity after examining the other monotheisms—apparently Latin Christianity was judged too shabby after Vladimir’s agents went to Germany, Islam’s prohibition on alcohol made it a non-starter, and the Jews’ defeat and exile from Israel meant they could not be the model for a rising Empire—and the “Philosopher’s Discourse” or “Philosopher’s Speech” is a section in the “Tale of Bygone Years”, where a Greek missionary convinces Vladimir to adopt Christianity.]
It is possible that at first, during the struggle of the Christian Church against Jewish influence, the anti-Jewish rhetoric was employed mainly in the service of apologetics. Even after the establishment of Christianity [as the Rus’ official religion in 988 AD], this controversy evidently continued, as reflected in the manuscripts of the time, such as “Sermon on Law and Grace” by the first Russian Metropolitan Hilarion, “The Explanatory Palea” [Tolkovaya Paleya], the thirteenth-century “Archivsky Chronograph” [Arkhivskiy khronograf] (XIII c.), and other works.8
In parallel with the literary polemics, practical attempts were made to convert Jews to Orthodoxy: an episode in “The Life of Saint Theodosius” [by Nestor the Chronicler (d. c. 1114)] is well-known, where “the blessed one … went to the Jews and argued with them about Christ; he reproached them and harassed them, calling them apostates and lawbreakers [or lawless people]”.9 In addition, the economic prosperity of the Jews could be used to exacerbate the hostility towards them.
Thus, the preconditions were created for the problematic situation in which ancient Russian Jewry found itself—a situation analogous to that which developed in Western Europe, where periods of relative economic well-being, even prosperity, alternated with periods of religious repression and pogroms. The first pogrom in the Rus took place as early as 1113, when the “Zhidovsky” quarter in Kiev was plundered.
[In modern Russian, “Zhidovsky” is a slur equivalent in tone and intent to “kike” in English, but its use was neutral in the twelfth century, meaning simply “Jewish Quarter”. This is why Tabak quotes it this way—so it is clear what he is talking about, since this is the name given to the area in all the chronicles, and to indicate it is not his own choice of term.]
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN ANTISEMITISM IN RUSSIA AND LATIN CHRISTENDOM
The subsequent history of the Russian State replicated the model of relations between Jewish and Christian populations that was generally characteristic of both the Kievan Rus and Western Europe: with its insecure socio-economic status, the Jewish community remained to a greater or lesser extent a persecuted religious-ethnic minority.
When studying the history of Russian Jews, it is easy to notice that the socio-religious oppression and persecution of Jews took forms already traditional in the West: exclusion from the professions, forced baptisms, “blood libels”, pogroms. The numerous Jewish ghettos in the towns of Western Europe can be compared to the “Pale of Settlement” in the Russian Empire. In the “heretical” movements in the Catholic world, such as, for example, Albigensianism [a.k.a. “the Cathars”], the authorities saw Jewish influence and subjected Jews to the cruellest persecution. Likewise in Russia, the “Judaizing” movement [of schismatic Christians] in the fifteenth century led to considerable trouble for Jews.10
Despite these similarities in the forms religious persecution of Jews took in Western Christendom and in Russia, it is necessary to note a number of differences concerning, so to speak, the “sources” of persecution.
In historical studies by Western scholars devoted to the issue of antisemitism, including Christian antisemitism, three constituent elements of medieval Christian society are traditionally identified and their relationships with the Jewish community are analysed and differentiated: the common people (viewed as plebs, “the masses”), the Church, and the State.
In terms of the State institutions, in the context of their relationship with the Jewish community, Western Europe and Russia once again have much in common. In both Europe and Russia, State legislation and official practice were determined by a series of shifting ideological, economic, and social factors, with the result that the degree of repression visited upon Jews was of a wave-like nature [i.e., ebbing and flowing], with periods alternating from relative calm and prosperity to bloody pogroms.
The Christian community, connected by numerous trading and economic ties to the Jewish community, maintained, during the “calm” periods, a more or less neutral attitude towards the Jews, and at an individual [or personal] level were sometimes even friendly.11 However, in general, the mixture of fear and hatred of Jews characteristic of medieval Christian consciousness (the religious roots of which will be discussed below) never disappeared: it remained latent, smouldered beneath the socio-economic necessity of maintaining the status quo. As soon as any new circumstances arose in public life—when certain social, financial and economic, Church-State or intra-Christian religious debates reached a boiling point—then the vulnerable Jewish community would become the target for financial and economic robbery, a pawn in someone’s political game, or a convenient scapegoat onto which the discontent of the lower orders could be deflected. It was never difficult to achieve goals in this way [by inciting against the Jews]—one had only to kindle the smouldering embers of religious hatred, and the dark, uneducated Christian masses turned into a fanatical mob [or rabble], ready to murder and pillage. This anti-Jewish feeling reached its apotheosis in the twentieth century, when six million Jews became the victims of Hitler’s genocide.12
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ANTISEMITISM IN RUSSIA AND LATIN CHRISTENDOM
There was, however, a fundamental difference between anti-Jewish policies in Russia and in European countries. The difference lies, in our opinion, in the incomparably smaller role of the Russian Orthodox Church in implementing such policies, as against the Orthodox Church of Byzantium, the Catholic Church of the early and late Middle Ages, and the Protestant denominations of Western Europe.
In the West (and partly in the East13), church policy in relation to the Jews was extremely contradictory. In the history of the Roman Church (for example, in the activities of Popes Innocent IV [(r. 1243-54)], Gregory X [(r. 1271-76)], etc.), one can find many examples of humane attitudes towards Jews, and protecting Jews from tyranny and antisemitic incitement. However, there are no fewer examples of the opposite kind, when anti-Jewish legislation and practical policies were either initiated by the Church authorities or implemented with their active participation. Moreover, there were times where the Western Church adopted a more active anti-Jewish stance than the State, and the State protected the Jewish community.14
It is unlikely that such examples can be found in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church. All anti-Jewish decisions, including those concerning purely religious issues, were adopted by State administrative organs, whether that was the Emperors, government committees, or the ministries, and this applied both the era of Patriarchal rule and the Synodal period.
[The Russian Orthodox Patriarchate lasted from 1589 to 1721, when Pyotr I or “Peter the Great” abolished the Patriarchate and made the Church into a government ministry, the Most Holy Synod. The Patriarchate was briefly restored after the “February Revolution” in 1917 and terminated eight months later by the Bolshevik coup.]
Even if some decisions were agreed upon by the Ecclesiastical Collegium under Pyotr I, and later approved by the Holy Synod, we should not forget that the aforementioned institutions were nothing more than State departments. As for the pre-Synodal era, when the Church maintained relative independence, it is difficult to find any concrete evidence of an officially declared anti-Jewish policy. By “official” here, we mean the decisions of the highest bodies of Church authority: the decrees of local and bishops’ councils, decrees of the Patriarch, and so on. Although it would be natural to assume a certain influence of the Church authorities on the State in the latter’s implementation of anti-Jewish measures, or even that such measures were initiated by the Church, there is no reliable evidence to support this.15
The Russian Church can certainly be criticised for its complete subordination to the State in the Synodal period, for its inability to defend an independent stance [or attitude], and also for failing to demonstrate [in practice] the declared basis of her creed, the evangelical [i.e., from the Gospels] love for one’s neighbour and a concern for the persecuted: unlike the Western Church, the Russian Orthodox Church took no steps to protect the Jews. But, let us emphasise once again, unlike the Western churches, anti-Jewish policies were not conducted in the name of the Russian Orthodox Church.
From here, of course, it does not follow that anti-Jewish sentiments were not intrinsic to the clergy and hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. The most vicious [rhetorical] attacks on Jews can be found in Orthodox polemical literature, and in the sermons and speeches of the most illustrious clerics and hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church—from Joseph Volotsky [or Joseph of Volotsk (d. 1515)] to Saint John of Kronstadt [(d. 1909)]. At the end of the nineteenth century, Archbishop Nikon of Vologda [(d. 1916)], Hieromonk Iliodor ([Sergei] Trufanov) [(d. 1952)], and Archpriest John Vostorgov [murdered by the Bolsheviks in 1918] were widely known for their antisemitic views. Though these individuals were not expressing an official Church position on the Jewish question, which simply had not been formulated, they were expressing the broadly negative attitude toward Jews that was widespread among the [Russian] people.
However, one cannot help but notice that an equal number of clergy in the Russian Orthodox Church, including its senior hierarchs, openly spoke out in defence of persecuted Jews—at least from the second half of the nineteenth century. Further, while in the West the pro-Jewish position was taken almost exclusively by representatives of liberal secular circles, who had to fight reactionary clerical circles (for example, in the Dreyfus Affair, where the Catholic Church in France essentially stood in solidarity with the government, and the liberals, led by [Émile] Zola, came to the defence of the slandered Jewish officer), in Russia the proportion of representatives of the Church among the defenders of the Jewish population was quite high.
Prominent hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church and professors of Theological Academies, refuted the accusations levelled against Jews—that they conducted pogroms, committed ritual murders, and were organising a “worldwide conspiracy”—and fought for the social rights of Jews.16 An active role in this campaign was played by outstanding Russian religious philosophers V.I. Solovyov, S. Bulgakov, V.I. Ilyin, and others. However, neither the quantity nor the passionate pathos of the Christian leaders’ appeals could change the general situation of religious hostility towards Jews, which has been characteristic of the bulk of the Russian population since Middle Ages. A corresponding attitude towards Jewry was reflected in State-Church legislation.17
THEOLOGY AND TRADITION: THE RESISTANCE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH TO REFORM
The eighteenth century became a turning point for the situation of Western European Jewry, with the steady expansion of their religious and civil rights. There was no such process in Russia. This circumstance, in our view, resulted from two basic facts.
First of all, the historical path of Russian is marked by the general weakness of liberal and democratic tendencies; their potential, unlike in the West, was too low to resist tendencies of a reactionary-protective and authoritarian nature, which permeated every level of public life. As such, Russia was bypassed by a number of major historical developments that played a decisive role in the fate of Western European Jewry—the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Reformation. Being unable to dwell on this important and complex topic within the confines of this article,18 we will briefly consider the second reason, namely the uniqueness of the religious and cultural features of Orthodoxy, under the influence of which attitudes towards Jewry were formed in Russia.
The fundamental position of Orthodox teaching is the inviolability [i.e., unchanging nature] of its doctrine since it was formulated in the era of [the seven] Ecumenical Councils [that ran from 325 to 681 AD] and recorded in the Holy Tradition, which is considered to “come from God”. At the same time, although the very concept of a Holy Tradition is broad and includes the whole historical experience of the church—the Bible, the liturgical life of the Church and its prayer, decrees of the Councils, the writings of the Church Fathers, the lives of the Saints, canon law, iconography, music, and architecture19—the theological foundation of modern Orthodoxy is the patristic Tradition, which developed before the end of the eighth century. This Tradition, by its very definition, has a “sacred” character, i.e., its religious and cultural value and relevance were never doubted.
In essence, the material contained in the Tradition has never been subjected to differentiation [in terms of its importance], i.e., the private statements of the Church Fathers, even if they contradict each other, are revered as equally sacred and no less meaningful than conciliar decrees and even the Bible.20 Therefore, it is no coincidence that the Russian Orthodox Church has always encouraged the reading of the hagiographers [of Church Fathers and Saints] and the patristic literature no less than, and often more than, the New and especially the Old Testament. Hence, the universally-accepted convention, in Orthodox polemics, of quoting from the Church Fathers, leaning on them as almost the only necessary evidence.
Since it is the duty of every Orthodox Christian to be guided by the teachings of the Church, embodied in the Holy Scripture and the Holy Tradition, then in his attitude towards Jews and Judaism he is called to be guided by the Holy Tradition, because, according to Orthodox teaching, the true meaning of Holy Scripture is revealed exclusively through the Holy Tradition. However, due to the particular socio-religious and historical circumstances of the patristic period, the Holy Tradition is suffused with a sharply anti-Jewish, and often openly antisemitic, spirit. This spirit was reflected both in the conciliar regulations and in the works of the Holy Fathers, where Jews were declared “deicides” [“murderers of God”] and “a despised people”. Generation after generation of Christians were raised in the spirit of enseignement du mepris, “the teaching of contempt” (in the words of French historian J. Isaac) towards Jewry, which led to almost two-thousand years of terrible persecution of Jews by Christian society.
[The Patristic Era—following the Apostolic Era, when Jesus’ followers were still around and the Gospels were being written—runs from the early second century to about the middle of the eighth century. The relationship of Christianity to the Jews was one of the key issues for the patristics, and the trendline ran one way. Theologically, this was a period where “barricades were being raised, and trenches dug”. Christianity had emerged as a sect within Ioudaismos and adopted the Tanakh wholesale: if there was to be a Christian orthodoxy, it would have to make sense of this inheritance by defining its doctrinal boundaries against the Jews. And to do that, Christians would have to explain why the Jews were in error. Which is what happened. These are the “socio-religious and historical circumstances” Tabak alludes to that give the patristic corpus such a “sharply anti-Jewish, and often openly antisemitic, spirit”.]
As noted above, religious hatred towards Jews has also for many centuries defined the consciousness of Christians in the West. But the opportunity for the evolution of doctrine, incarnated in the historical practice of the Roman Catholic Church, in conditions where there was a process of decomposition of the traditional medieval worldview and growing of anti-clerical tendencies, allowed the fathers of the Council of Trent (1545-63) to formulate a thesis that directly emphasised: the guilt of Christians, who with their sins continue to crucify the Son of God, is greater than the guilt of the Jews.21 At the Second Vatican Council [(1962-65)], the Catholic Church absolved the Jewish people of guilt for the death of Christ and expressed its “sorrow” in relation to manifestations of antisemitism. In the ensuing thirty years, the Catholic theological understanding of Israel underwent further major changes, and critical progress was made in relations between Catholics and Jews.22
Unlike the Catholic Church—which, like with the Orthodox Church, has always revered the Church Tradition as sacred, albeit while taking a differentiated and critical approach to the Tradition—Protestants from the very beginning declared Church Tradition to be a human creation. This allowed them to reject the prevailing medieval anti-Jewish concept and, when formulating their own position on the [Jewish] issue, to base it on new criteria. This step did not at all prevent historical Protestantism from periodically manifesting antisemitism, but it gave them the opportunity each time to reformulate their religious-ideological approach in the context of a changing society. As a result, the post-Holocaust position of many Protestant churches in relation to Jews and Judaism was the most radical and consistent, categorically rejecting any form of antisemitism and anti-Judaism, rejecting a paternalistic attitude towards Judaism, and, finally, in its refusal of any form of missionary activity among Jews.
Thus, the Western churches had the opportunity to develop a new position in relation to Judaism, which they did in the second half of the twentieth century. In contrast to them, the Russian Orthodox Church has not taken such steps, remaining entirely guided by the patristic Tradition about “the Jews who crucified Christ”. Its teaching continues to be formally and essentially based on medieval notions—hence, the statements of even the most ardent antisemites among the Orthodox, who justify their monstrous anti-Jewish invective based on “Church teaching”, can seem quite logical.
Indeed: if, for example, [Saint] John Chrysostom [(d. 407 AD)], one of the most esteemed Church Fathers, called the Jews “unclean and foul” and the synagogue “a refuge of demons”, then, then why should an Orthodox Christian who accepts the sanctity of the Tradition think differently? After all, nearly all of the most revered Church Fathers had attitudes towards Jews that were similar to John Chrysostom’s, as did the most revered figures of the Orthodox Church in later times, from Bishop Ignatius Brianchaninov [(d. 1867)] to St. John of Kronstadt.23 On the other hand, we do not know of even one Church Father who openly professed his fervent love for the Jews of his time, guided by the evangelical commandments. In this sense, the position of those modern authors who angrily denounce antisemites by denying that they belong to “true” Christianity seem rather strange.24 Following such logic, the most revered pillars of the Christian Church can be called “pseudo-Christians”, and the Christian Church can be denied [the label of] “truth”, judging by the sorrowful two-thousand-year history of Judeo-Christian relations. But what, then, is “true” Christianity?!
RUSSIAN ORTHODOX ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS NOW [I.E., IN 2000]
In order to somehow answer this question, attempts have been made to identify the “positive” tendencies in historical Christianity that were opposed to Christian antisemitism, looking in particular at the Orthodox heritage of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.25 These attempts had limited success: in calling Christians to religious tolerance and condemning antisemitism, the overwhelming majority of Orthodox clergy saw the solution to the Jewish question (in the perspective of history or “End Times”) only in terms of Jews converting to Christianity. They explained the Jews’ reluctance to accept Christ not only by reference to the unworthiness of Christians themselves, but also by citing the temporal “blindness” of the Jews. This latter framework meant Jews were often not perceived as brothers, but enemies who must be “loved”. Such positions, often held up as an example of a “truly” Christian attitude towards Jews, have never led, and could not lead, to the eradication of Christian antisemitism, as has been convincingly shown in numerous works by Western researchers.26
There are no exceptions here, contrary to the opinions of contemporary Orthodox liberals, and the views of Russian religious philosophers on the Jewish question: behind the incoherence and internal contradictions of their position lies essentially (even if involuntarily) the same Christian antisemitism.27 However, the paradox is that even if it were possible to find the most pro-Jewish views in the Orthodox tradition, this would not solve anything: everyone would simply draw from Tradition what he likes, and the Black Hundred position would still remain completely legitimate, alongside the Judeophile one, since neither would stray outside the bounds of Tradition.28 The only way out of this impasse we can see would be for a firm and clear statement from the Orthodox Church about its teachings, which would consider the Holy Tradition in a new light—in the way the Roman Catholic Church has done.29
Thus, all of the Orthodox tradition, including its most liberal strata, underlies the current attitude of the modern clergy and laity of the Russian Orthodox Church towards Jews and Judaism,30 which we will consider further below. In order to do this, it is useful to divide Orthodox believers into four main groups:
One: A relatively small but very active part of the grassroots priesthood, in which an important role is played by monastics.
The representatives [of this faction], together with a number of lay activists, belong to a number of socio-political movements, operating mainly under the banner of Orthodoxy,31 whose outlook and ideology essentially combines tendencies that are antisemitic, anti-Western (including in relation to Western Christian denominations), and anti-democratic—[as seen in] the Russian National Council [RNS], Russian National Unity [RNE], the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods [SPB], and others. The mouthpieces of this group, which include quite a few well-known cultural figures—writers, artists, and cinematographers—are served by several periodicals, “Moskva”, “Molodaya Gvardiya”, and “Nash Sovremennik” [“Moscow”, “Young Guard”, and “Our Contemporary”], and the newspapers “Zavtra”, “Russkiy Vestnik”, “Russkaya Gazeta” [“Tomorrow”, “The Russian Messenger” (or “The Russian Herald”), “The Russian Gazette”], and others.32 Dozens of books have come from the pens of this group’s ideologists. They have various ideas for the salvation of the Orthodox Rus from the “Jewish conspiracy”—from racial and religious tests of candidates for government posts to demanding the complete expulsion of Jews.33
Two: The overwhelming majority of rural and urban parish priests and laypeople who regularly attend church.
They are characterised by a generally low level of religious education and their church life reduces mainly to the proper performance of Orthodox rites and observance of fasts. The Jewish-Christian issue, like all other topics that have no relevance in their everyday lives, is paid practically no attention, although some suspicion and religious fear of Jews is often present due to their familiarity with the basic contours of the Orthodox Tradition regarding “the Jews who crucified Christ”.34 This negative attitude towards Jews is generally a passive one, but in the event of a change in the socio-political climate, or an intensification of the activity of the first group, one can expect a growth in religious aggression towards Jews from this second group, as has happened more than once in Russian history. In this light, education and the democratization of society take on a special importance, as they are known to significantly reduce the levels of religious intolerance.
Three: The Church hierarchy, the authors and exponents of the official position of the Church, form a distinct group.
The senior hierarchs of the Church occupied their high positions during the Communist era, which has, of course, left a deep imprint on their psychological make-up and the conduct of Church policy. The latter, as we see it, is oriented not so much to pan-Orthodox ideology, nor the individual views of this or that hierarch, but, rather, are determined by the prevailing socio-political and socio-religious situation. The financial and economic dependence of the Church on the State is too great, and, accordingly, when developing a general Church position, the hierarchy has to be sensitive to the strength of competing ideologies in the State power structures. In turn, the important socio-political forces in modern Russia—the “national-patriotic”, “democratic-reformist”, and others—hold differing views on the role and place of Orthodoxy in public life, as was reflected in the long struggle between various socio-political forces over the drafting of the Law On Freedom of Conscience [and Religious Associations (1997)].35 The Church leadership, in developing an appropriate line, is forced to navigate between the conservative tradition and the demands of the political establishment.
There is, moreover, a whole series of additional factors which influence the position of the Church hierarchy: the need for individual hierarchs to lobby on behalf of certain socio-religious interests, internal struggles for power and influence, the need to save face in front of Western Church circles, and so on.
The uncertainty and instability of the general political situation in Russia is reflected in the uncertainty and instability of the ideological line of the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church, which affects literally every area of church life: liturgical reform, social policy, the ecumenical movement. The same inconsistency and contradictions are evident in relation to the problem of antisemitism.
In his speech to the New York Jewish community [it was actually a group of rabbis] at the end of 1991, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus Aleksey II [(r. 1990-2008)] appeared to define the position of the Russian Orthodox Church by addressing the Jews as “brothers” and decisively rejecting antisemitism in all its manifestations. However, this speech, which caused a storm of criticism both from the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and from the Moscow Patriarchate, especially among monastics,36 seems to have evaporated into thin air without having altered the prevailing attitudes in church circles. On the contrary: in the years afterwards, antisemitic sermons, articles, and speeches by the now deceased Metropolitan of Saint Petersburg and Ladoga, John ([Ivan] Snychev), have been actively circulated.37 The Moscow Patriarchate limited itself to responding with a terse statement that these were merely the “personal” views of the Metropolitan.
There was no reaction from the Moscow Patriarchate to the publication of dozens of books by Orthodox authors with openly antisemitic content, nor to the articles in the fascist and neo-fascist press by people calling themselves “Orthodox”. In churches and Orthodox bookshops one can easily buy “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion”, printed under the cover of S. Nilus’s book, Velikoye v malom [i antikhrist kak blizkaya politicheskaya vozmozhnost'. Zapiski pravoslavnogo veruyushchego [“The Great Within the Small and Antichrist, an Imminent Political Possibility: Notes of an Orthodox Believer”]. In addition, occasionally openly antisemitic books are published by Church institutions.38
The hierarchy does not respond to the appeals of the few clergy and laypeople who are concerned about the problem of antisemitism, nor to the appeals of Western Orthodox theologians in connection with the same problem.39 Instead, with the exception of Metropolitan John [or Ioann], who had the full support of the first group identified above, the remaining hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church prefer not to touch on the Jewish question at all and not to take any measures in this regard (continuing the long tradition of the Russian Orthodox Church), limiting themselves to general appeals for love and tolerance and hoping to avoid provoking criticism from either the most conservative Orthodox strata or the democrats in society.40
Four: There is a particular group of the clergy who campaign for a renewal of Church life, who advocate ecumenical dialogue with members of other Christian denominations, and who resolutely condemn Orthodox antisemitism.
Their views are reflected in the journals “Logos” and “Stranitsy” [“The Word (of God)” and “Pages”], in the newspapers “Russkaya Mysl”, “Segodnya”, and “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” [“Russian Mind” (or “Russian Thought”), “Today”, and the “Independent Newspaper”], and in the broadcasts of the Moscow-based radio station “Sofia”. There are also laymen, mainly the parishioners of several churches in Moscow, who share these views. However, the total number of such clergy and laity, who are constantly the object of fierce attacks from the conservative strata of the Muscovite clergy,41 is very small. Moreover, the contradictions inherent in the Orthodox conceptions regarding attitudes towards Jews, as described above, means this group of Orthodox believers is unable to present a convincing theological justification for its position.42
CONCLUSION
Finally, let us consider the practical effects that current attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church towards Jews may have.
Religious persecution [of Jews] in its medieval form is hardly possible today: this conclusion is reached not only because of our hope that Russia will follow a civilised and democratic path,43 but also, sadly, because of the gradual erosion of the Russian Jewish religious community—the possible target of such persecution.
The primary reason for the rapid decrease in the number of religious Jews [in Russia] is mass Jewish emigration [after the collapse of the Soviet Union]. The population of Russian Jews at the end of 1993, based on the official census, is estimated at less than 400,000.44 The majority of practicing Jews have emigrated, while the overwhelming majority of those who remain are almost entirely assimilated and secularised Jews.
Further democratisation in the country, and the removal of the notorious “fifth paragraph” in passports [which had in Soviet times designated Jews as a separate nationality], will, in all likelihood, accelerate the assimilation processes. In addition, one should not discount the importance of the trend within the Jewish intelligentsia of conversions to Christianity that have taken place over recent decades.45
A whole series of other sociological factors still divide the Christian and Jewish communities, reducing to near non-existence the possibility of dialogue between them, which is unhelpful in [the project of] removing entrenched religious stereotypes and achieving mutual understanding between Orthodox Christians and Jews.46
However, neither the low probability of pogromist sentiment developing, nor the objective difficulties of Judeo-Christian relations, should become the excuse for the stagnation of Christian religious thought. For it is probably only by rethinking issues central to Christians—the fate of Israel, the Jewish origins of Christianity, antisemitism as the worst sin in the history of Christianity—that it will be possible to overcome the “crisis of the medieval world view” (in the words of V. Solovyov [(d. 1900)]) and, follow [the example of] Western Christians by taking a decisive step forward [in Orthodox-Jewish relations].
FOOTNOTES
This does not mean that we do not consider the other Christian denominations to have religious significance for Russia; we have seen an intensification of their activities since the beginning of perestroika [in the late 1980s], (see Na puti k svobode sovesti, Moscow, “Progress” 1989, Religiya i demokratiya. Na puti k svobode sovesti, 2nd Edition, Moscow, “Progress”, 1993). However, it is difficult to say anything definite about the attitude of representatives of these denominations towards the Jewish community in modern Russia; as far as we know there are no separate sociological or other studies on this topic. A general comparative assessment of the various religious denominations’ attitudes towards Jews can be found in the works of L. Vorontsova and S. Filatov. See Bibliography in Pravoslavnaya tserkov i evrei: XIX-XX vv [“The Orthodox Church and the Jews: The Nineteenth to Twentieth Centuries”], Moscow, “Rudomino—Bog Edin”, 1994, p. 130.
In Russia, this movement is represented particularly by [the journal of] the Association of Humanistic Judaism, Evreiskii mir [“The Jewish World”].
See, for example, the entry “Jew” in The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, Vol.2, Nashville, 1962, pp. 897-898.
The predominance of the ethnic component of the understanding of the word “evrei” [“Jew”], is particular to Russian, thus the phrase “evrei-khristianin” [“Jewish-Christian”] does not arouse particular surprise. This combination of words is not possible in Western European languages, although the understanding of the word “Jew” ([for example, in English, French, and German,] Jew, Juif, Jude) has to a large extent absorbed both the ethnic and religious meanings: it can imply a practising Jew, a secularised Jew, an ethnically Jewish person who practises Buddhism or any Eastern cult, and finally can be used to describe a non-Jew who has adopted Judaism, but it cannot be used for an ethnically Jewish person who professes Christianity. The latter might be called a “converted Jew”, but never simply a “Jew”. It is not accidental that within a framework of a clearly defined “Jew-Christian” dichotomy, religious movements in the West that to one degree or another are oriented towards Christian religious values but have some roots in the ethnically Jewish milieu, would never self-designate as “Christian”, preferring instead to call themselves “Jews for Jesus”, “Messianic Jews”, and so on.
A short bibliography of the literature in Russian can be found in our afterword to the book by J.-P. Likhtenberg, Ot pervovo do poslednego iz pravednikov. K istorii evreisko-khristianskikh otnoshenii [“From the First to the Last of the Just: A History of Jewish-Christian Relations”]. Moscow, “Put”, 1996, pp. 107-8.
Evreiskaya entsyklopediya, Saint Petersburg, Brockhaus-Yefron, 1906-1912,Vol IX, 516-17.
See for example, M. Yu. Braichevsky, Utverzhdeniye khristianstva na Rusi, Kiev, “Naukova dumka”, 1989, pp. 217-223.
S. Dudakov, Istoriya odnogo mifa [“The History of a Myth”], Moscow, “Nauka”, 1993, pp 9-14.
It is not inconceivable, incidentally, that some Jews were forcibly baptised, along with a significant proportion of the Slavic pagan population, and that such visits [by people like Saint Theodosius] were designed to test the loyalty of the Jews and expose any secret heresy among them. See G.M. Barats. Povesti i skazaniya drevnerusskoi pismennosti, imeiushchiye otnosheniye k evreiam i evreistvu, Kiev, Kievskaya starina, 1906.
Evreiskaya Entsyklopedia, vol. II, p. 115-116; Kratkaya Evreiskaya entsyklopedia, Jerusalem, 1976- , vol. 7, p. 289.
A brilliant analysis of the complex and contradictory relationship between the Christian population and the Jewish community in the Middle Ages can be found in the book by the modern Jewish historian, J. Katz, Jews in Medieval Europe, (Jerusalem, “Biblioteka Alia”, 1997), now available in Russian.
There are numerous works which analyse the roots and causes of antisemitism, and the mechanisms of its manifestation, in the Christian world. For relatively recent general studies on this theme, see: Gavin L. Langmuir, History, Religion, and Antisemitism, USA, 1990, and Yves Chevalier, L’antisémitisme, Paris, 1988. What is important for our purposes is the fact that various social groups and institutions of Christian society had an interest in and participated in anti-Jewish policies.
In pointing out the differences between the Russian Orthodox Church and the policy of the Western Churches, in particular the Roman Catholic Church, regarding their attitudes towards the Jews, this should not be viewed as just a specific example of the customary opposition of West and East or Catholicism versus Orthodoxy. The policies of local Eastern Orthodox Churches towards the Jews varied widely—from the more or less benevolent attitude (primarily in modern times) of the Serbian and Bulgarian Churches, to the clearly anti-Jewish views of the Greek and especially the Romanian [Orthodox] Churches. See: Kratkaya Evreiskaya Entsyklopedia, vol. 6, 729-733.
A general overview and analysis of the policies of the Christian Church in the West towards the Jews can be found in the popular book by Malcolm Hay, Thy Brother’s Blood [subtitle: “The Roots of Christian Antisemitism”], (Jerusalem, “Aliya”, 1991, now available in Russian.
It is no coincidence that in the entry on “Orthodoxy” in the seventh volume of the Kratkaya Yevreyskaya Entsiklopedia [“Shorter Jewish Encyclopaedia”], devoted to the Russian Orthodox Church (pp. 733-743), where numerous examples are given of persecution of the Jews in Russia, including religious persecution, no evidence is given of the direct participation of the Church, neither in legislative terms nor in the practical conduct of policy. Although the authors of the article state that the active role of the Church in inciting the government to anti-Jewish actions is “obvious” (for example, in the case of Ivan the Terrible’s policies in the conquered areas), the article offers no facts to justify their conclusions.
See the collection: Pravoslavnaya tserkov i evrei: XIX-XX vv. Substantial excerpts from the speeches of Russian Church hierarchs in defence of the Jews can be found in the important article by V.N. Toporov: “‘Spor’ ili ‘druzhba’?” [“‘Dispute’ or ‘Friendship’?”] in collection AQUINOX. Sbornik pamyati o. Aleksandra Menia, Moscow 1991, pp. 91-162.
There are a huge number of historical studies analysing the difficult legal position of Russian Jews. However, this does not prevent a well-meaning author from leading his readers astray. For example, V.N. Toporov, although he notes in the above-mentioned article the “facts of injustice, … violence, lies, slander against Jews”, concentrates his attention on “the opposing positive evidence”. He gets so carried away in this fascination that he slips into euphoria, concluding that “the secular authorities, the government administration, and the Church guarded the gradually expanding rights of Jews” (p. 99) and that “society as a whole [!] defended the rights of the Jewish population” (ibid.). It is difficult to imagine how such an erudite scholar does not know that, in general, the social and economic position of Jews in pre-revolutionary Russia was steadily deteriorating, and that even the half-hearted “transformative” projects aimed at improving their situation never materialised; that anti-Jewish sentiment was increasing in the decades before the Revolution, culminating in pogroms, “blood libels”, and the appearance of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion; and that dozens of the most talented cultural figures in Russia—from Lermontov to Blok—were to one degree or another antisemitic. Like many other members of the Russian intelligentsia, V.N. Toporov is unconsciously (there is apparently no other explanation) passing off wishful thinking as reality.
See Richard Pipes’s book, Russia under the Old Regime (Moscow, “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, 1993), whose views we generally share.
Archpriest Thomas Hopko, Osnovy Pravoslaviya [“Foundations of Orthodoxy”], New York, 1987, p. 9.
In Orthodox catechisms and the works of Orthodox theologians, it is sometimes pointed out that there are hierarchical layers to the Holy Tradition [i.e., some ranking of its importance], that only those statements of the Church Fathers that do not contradict each other have value ([a principle known as] consensus patrum), that personal/private theological opinions [of the Holy Fathers] have to be distinguished from doctrinal rulings, that there is a possibility of dogmatic evolution, etc. However, in practice, no corresponding analysis of the religious heritage of the patristic period, let alone any dogmatic evolution, has taken place.
See J.-P. Likhtenberg, Ot pervogo do poslednego iz pravednikov, pp. 53-54.
Ibid, pp. 101, 511–61.
See: T. Reinach, Textes d’auteurs grecs et romains relatifs au judaïsm, Paris, 1895 (and numerous reprints); the collection of articles: Israil v proshlom, nastoyashchem i budushchem [“Israel: Past, Present, and Future”], Sergiev Posad, 1915; and Archpriest John Sergiev (Kronstadtskiy), Nachalo i konets nashego zemnogo mira [“The Beginning and End of Our Earthly World”], Saint Petersburg, 1904.
See articles by M. Chaikovskiy, Z.A. Krakhmalnikova, in Russkaya ideia i evrei [“The Russian Idea and the Jews”], Moscow, “Nauka”, 1994.
See: Pravoslavnaya tserkov i evrei: XIX-XX vv.
See: A. Roy Eckhardt, Elder and Younger Brothers, New York, 1967, which provides an extensive bibliography of works devoted to this important topic.
See: Taina Israilya [“The Secret of Israel”], “Sofia”, Saint Petersburg, 1993. S. Lezov, in his article, “Natsionalnaya ideia i khristianstvo” [“The National Idea and Christianity”], Russkaya ideia i evrei, gives a convincing critique of the views of N.A. Berdyaev—perhaps the most liberal of Russian religious philosophers—on Jews and Judaism. In this light, the recent publication of archive materials in the press does not seem so sensational. [It is much less surprising that] A.F. Losev, the leading light of the Soviet intelligentsia, considered by many to be a model of scholarly and humanistic integrity, a true scientist-philosopher, has been revealed as an antisemitic ideologist of the classical medieval kind. See “Segodnya”, October 18, 1996, p. 5.
Here parallels can be drawn between the religious heritage of Nil Sorski and Joseph Volotsky, two outstanding activists in the fifteenth century Russian Church, who held diametrically opposed views on most fundamental issues of Church life. Both of them were canonised by the Church [i.e., made Saints]—so an Orthodox Christian can freely choose whether he should, for example, follow the opinion of Joseph Volotsky that, “killing a transgressor and heretic with your bare hands is the same as prayer”, or follow the precepts of Nil Sorski in “trying not to reproach nor condemn anyone for anything”.
A positive role here may also be played by the position, which has been observed by many researchers, but which is quite unknown to the overwhelming majority of Orthodox clergy and laity: the theological rejection of Judaism in Orthodox teaching paradoxically coexists with a veneration for Old Testament Saints in Orthodoxy, with the obvious continuity between the ancient synagogue worship and Byzantine Orthodox worship, the similarities in the structure of annual liturgical cycles, and so on. Proper education in this field could significantly change the attitude of Orthodox believers to Judaism. See: C. W. Dugmore, The Influence of the Synagogue upon the Divine Office , London, 1964; E. Werner, The Sacred Bridge – The Interdependence of Liturgy and Music in Synagogue and Church during the First Millenium, London, 1959; D. Flusser, Die Sakramente und das Judentum, Judaica 39 (1983), pp. 3–18.
The position set out here, from which follows the conclusion about the fundamental contradiction inherent in the very dogmatic-doctrinal structure of Orthodoxy, will inevitably provoke bewilderment and protest among some believers who cannot imagine themselves outside of Orthodoxy and at the same time categorically do not accept antisemitism. Some of these Orthodox (clergy and laity) I have had the honour of knowing personally, and I have the deepest respect for them. Based on repeated conversations with them, it seems to me that their argumentation on this issue can be summed up as follows: the value of Orthodoxy lies in the main not in the historically formed “Scripture-Tradition” relationship, nor in the theoretical and practical conclusions that flow from it, but in the truly ancient liturgical structure, in the emotional impact of Eastern Orthodox rites and hymns, in the incomparable beauty and spirituality of Orthodox churches, where “the real presence of God” is felt. From the Orthodox heritage, that which accords with the enlightened spirit and cultural attitudes of these believers is arbitrarily chosen. In other words, the theological foundations of Orthodoxy as a whole are not taken into consideration and are not seen as significant for religious practice. In such an emotional-subjective perception of the Orthodox faith, the anti-Jewish component of Orthodoxy is not reflected in any way, and its historical relapses are found only in liturgical texts that are slated to be changed.
However, it is easy to see that the primacy accorded to the emotional and individual-subjective perceptions [of believers] is precisely why there is such little cause for optimism: there are not very many subtle connoisseurs of ancient aesthetics who view Orthodoxy through this prism.. The overwhelming majority of people see their religious allegiance as obedience to authoritative church teaching (as in the case of Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and the main Protestant denominations), or to the teaching of charismatic sectarian leaders, and formulate their convictions in conformity with the theological principles instilled in them thiswise. The theological pillars of Orthodox doctrine on the subject of Jews and Judaism are already known to us. Of course, a positive role could be played if there was differentiation of Church Tradition, if it was sanctified by Church authority, and, conversely, by criticism of individual components (see footnote 20)—however, even if this work was ever completed, will we be able to speak of Orthodoxy in its classical definition? For, if such a course were taken, it would involve a reconsideration, or at least the giving of an entirely new meaning, to the fundamental theological postulates of Orthodoxy about God’s “rejection” of the Jews, the replacement of the “Old” Testament by the “New”, etc. But will this not be some new kind of doctrine that has nothing in common with historical Orthodoxy, and, above of all, with the Orthodoxy of the Church Fathers?
Some nationalist organisations proclaim paganism or neo-paganism as their religion, declaring Christianity to be a “Jewish invention”.
Some of these newspapers which say they are “Orthodox”—“Zemshchina”, “Tushino”, “Russkoye Voskresenie”, and others—are devoted almost exclusively to Jewish topics. These publications preach antisemitism of the most monstrous kind. Periodically, their publishers have to defend themselves in court against accusations of inciting racial hatred, but they never suffer any serious punishment. Sometimes these newspapers are banned, but they reappear under the same or a new name. To all intents and purposes, the laws banning printed materials of a fascist nature, which serve as incitement to racial and religious hatred, have not yet gone into effect.
“Poetomu my dolzhny gnat IKH v sheiu …” [“So we must throw THEM out by the neck …”) “Russkoye Voskreseniye”, no 4/12, p. 4. It is interesting that the medieval idea that baptism of Jews as a path to their salvation and as a panacea for the troubles of Christian society is no longer considered valid by the most ardent antisemites at the present time who call themselves “Orthodox”. [One such figure recently wrote:] “It is to be hoped that Archpriest Alexander Men has atoned for the sin of ecumenism by his death [in 1990]. For, as Serafim of Sarov states [?—Tabak], the only way a Jew can be saved is by accepting a martyr’s death for the sake of our Lord” (ibid., p. 1). Evidently, this development is linked to the strengthening of the racial dimension of antisemitism throughout the nineteenth century, when people began to believe that the racial inferiority of the Jew and his “satanic” nature could not be cured even by religious conversion.
See: Pravoslavnaya tserkov i evrei: XIX–XX vv. This contains the first and to our knowledge the only sociological study which compares the attitudes of Orthodox and atheists to Jews (V. Borzenko, “Antisemitizm i pravoslaviye v sovremennoi Rossii” [“Antisemitism and Orthodoxy in Modern Russia”], pp 99-106). This study was published in 1992. Both Orthodox and atheists were categorised according to age and education. The results led the author to the somewhat surprising conclusion that there is a lower level of antisemitism among Orthodox believers than among atheists. However, it seems to use that V. Borzenko did not take into account a very important factor: that the majority of those surveyed, who identified as Orthodox, are only nominally so due to the traditional habit of equating “Russian” and “Orthodox”. This is demonstrated in, for example, the interesting research conducted by L. Byzov and S. Filatov (“Religiya i obshchestvo segodnya” [“Religion and Society Today”] in Religiya i demokratiya, pp. 9–42), where only 13% of those declaring themselves Orthodox in Moscow said that they “believe in God” (p. 28)! As such, the boundary between Orthodox and atheist nowadays is blurry in the majority of cases, so drawing any real conclusions from the answers of respondents self-identifying between “Orthodox” and “atheist” seems senseless to us. In addition, the failure to take into account factors other than age and education—such as regional particularities, professional status, etc.—makes Borzenko’s sample of Orthodox Christians unrepresentative. Naturally, the thoughtful approach of L. Byzov and S. Filatov yielded different results: according to their research, [practising] Orthodox believers have a somewhat higher level of prejudice towards Jews and Judaism than non-believers (p. 32).
See: Materialy parliamentskikh slushanii: Svoboda sovesti i prava cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Analiticheskiy vypusk, No.13, Moscow, Gumanitary, 1995.
See: Speech by Patriarch Aleksey II to the Rabbis of New York, 13 November 1991, USA, 1992. (Issued in Russia by “TOO Pallada” publishers, 1992); “Molim vas—prislushaityes” in Russkaya pravoslavnaya tserkov v sovetskoye vremya, vol II, Moscow, “Propilei”, 1995, pp 335-338. Rumour has it that some of the monastics even stopped mentioning the Patriarch’s name during the liturgy.
The basic ideas of Metropolitan Ioann can be found in his book, Samoderzhaviye dukha [“Autocracy of the Spirit”], Saint Petersburg, 1994. See also a detailed review of the book in: I. Levinskaya, “Ranny Gitler, Pozdny Stalin, niezlobivy Ivan Grozniy i drugiye” [“Early Hitler, Late Stalin, Good-natured Ivan the Terrible and Others”], Barier, Saint Petersburg 1994, pp. 11-13.
For example the Memoirs of Prince Zhevakhov, prepared for publication by the publishing department of the Spaso-Preobrazhensky Stavropegic Monastery.
See: Pravoslavnaya tserkov i evrei: XIX-XX vv., pp 81, 82, 92; Y. Tabak, “Ochen’ aktualno, no sovershenno secretno” [“Very Relevant, But Top Secret”], “Megapolis-Express”, No. 18/30, August 1990, p. 13.
One can only guess at the true views of the Church hierarchs on various Jewish-Christian issues. However, occasionally the veil of secrecy is lifted: Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad an educated man, a gifted orator and experienced administrator who is widely tipped to be the next Patriarch [he took the job in 2009], unexpectedly announced at an evening dedicated to the memory of Anne Frank that the suffering and death of Jews during the Second World War had a “redemptive purpose”. In this case, such a statement can hardly be explained by opportunistic circumstances—it is as if the Metropolitan “let it slip”. (Kratkaya Evreiskaya Entsyklopedia, vol. 6, p. 742).
Mainly for their “pro-Catholic” position and “Renovationism” [“Obnovlenchestvo”]. See “Russkaya mysl”, 24-30 October 1994, pp 8-9.
Perhaps only Archpriest Vitaly Borovoy (who, however, belongs to a more conservative strata of the clergy) has tried to find reasons why antisemitism is sinful according to Orthodox Church Tradition. See V. Borovoy “Christian Orthodoxy in the Modern World” in Orthodox Christians and Jews on Contiunity and Renewal, Immanuel 26/27, Jerusalem 1994. Other Orthodox authors, many of whose views we share (A. Kyrlezhev, “Zachem evreii khristianam?” [“Why Do Jews Need Christians?”], “Evreiskaya gazeta”, No.1-2, 1994; V.N. Toporov, op.cit.), skirt around this question and are led purely by their personal theological views.
Although there have been some individual tragic events, such as the recent desecration of Jewish graves and the burning of a synagogue in Moscow, the recurrence of which unfortunately cannot be ruled out in the future—as in many other countries where there is a Jewish population, antisemitism will never be eliminated—this type of vandalism is currently more a product everyday and racial antisemitism, or ordinary hooliganism. Very rarely are these events conscious manifestations of religious (Christian) antisemitism.
Kratkaya Yevreyskaya Entsiklopedia [“Shorter Jewish Encyclopaedia”], vol. 7, Jerusalem, 1994, col. 402. It should, however, be noted that the statistical data for the Jewish population of Russia, given in foreign sources, usually exceeds the figures given in Russian statistics; sometimes it is almost double (I am grateful to Professor Donna Arzt, of the Syracuse University College of Law, USA, for this information).
Obviously, the number of baptised Jews is an insignificant number of the total number of Russian Jews, and the conversions of Jews to Christianity have taken place mainly in Moscow and a few other large cities. That said, it is important to note that many of the Jewish converts belonged to the cultural elite, which formed a spiritual and intellectual environment to resist Soviet “spirituality”. The Christianization of the Russian intelligentsia [under the Communist nightmare], and in particular of the Jews (to a large extent under the influence of the books and sermons of Fr. Aleksander Men [who was born to a Jewish family]) was a unique and contradictory process that deserves a separate study. See T. Ptushkina, G.Yeremeyev, “U Kosmy i Damiana” in Pravoslavnaya tserkov i evrei: XIX-XX vv., pp 118-123; L. Vorontsova, S.Filatov “Rossiiskiye evreii i Tserkov v zerkale sotsiologii”. Ibid, pp 130, 133. As for the activity of Protestant missionary organisations specialising in the conversion of Jews (“Jews for Jesus”, “Messianic Jews”, etc.), despite extensive activity, they do not appear to have achieved any significant results.
See our article: Y. Tabak: “The Difficulties and Prospects of Jewish-Christian Interreligious Dialogue” in the collection Dia-Logos. Religia i obshchestvo, 1997, Moscow, “Istina i Zhizn”, 1997, pp. 43-60.