Islamic State Explains How It Is “Globalising the Jihad”
Islamic State Explains How It Is “Globalising the Jihad”
The 450th edition of Al-Naba, the weekly newspaper of the Islamic State (IS), published on 4 July, had as its main editorial a description of the model the group uses in its global attacks campaign, specifically relating to what are often called “lone wolves”.
IS’s primary point was that those who have given their bay’a (oath or pledge of allegiance) to the “caliph” are a part of the Islamic State, regardless of any material connection, because to sign-up to IS’s ideology is, in its perception, to adopt the only true version of Islam, therefore, its loyalists across the world are joined to the same common bond of faith and brotherhood as IS jihadists fighting on the ground in Iraq-Syria, Africa, and Afghanistan. Moreover, those who have “fulfilled their bay’a with their blood”—that is, been killed during a terrorist attack they carried out because of IS’s call for such attacks—have documented their allegiance in the most unimpeachable way possible.
This might seem like a convoluted way for IS to claim more ownership of terrorists in Europe and elsewhere who act in its name than really exists—and that is true to some extent. The Naba editorial is boasting that IS’s “discourse” is increasingly attracting “Muslim youth” around the world to the path of its “pure” jihad, at a time when “nationalism” and other pollutants are misdirecting the violent energies of this population, a reference inter alia to the pull of HAMAS and Iran’s other jihadist units because of the war against Israel. But there is more to this.
Most of the IS terrorists in Europe establish contact with the group before their attacks, secretly give their bay’a, and receive sanction and sometimes advice for what they are about to do. Often, IS will then release the video showing the terrorist’s bay’a as proof that the operative was one of theirs and they are not claiming him after-the-fact. This set-up also allows IS to avoid claiming operatives who get arrested or otherwise mess up.
Al-Naba 450 alludes to this process, and makes three notable points: (1) it is stated quite plainly that while IS follows a rigorous “specific policy” in claiming attacks—which is true, the persistent belief to the contrary notwithstanding—it keeps IS’s options open in “adopting” some attacks and merely “blessing and praising” others; (2) obviously IS has many more secret than overt loyalists in Europe and beyond; and (3) these lone attackers attacks continue to be “managed” by IS’s security and media apparatus. Thus, even as IS is leaning into the idea of “lone wolf” or “inspired” attacks, it is clear that its guides continue to remote-control much of the escalating terrorism.
Two further points from the editorial deserve attention. First, IS suggests that it is setting aside its historic practice of not publicly admitting a terrorist is one of its agents if they are arrested. Second, IS tells its loyalists not to refrain from carrying out an attack just because they cannot film it, important though footage of these atrocities is, an indicator that IS wishes to see as many attacks as it can as quickly as possible, presumably to give some credibility to IS’s proclamation that it has initiated a new foreign attacks campaign in January.
Finally, the picture accompanying the editorial serves as the de facto adoption of a series of attacks, some of which IS has not previously publicly acknowledged being responsible for. The image shows: the Swiss teenager of Tunisian descent who stabbed a Jewish man in Zurich on 2 March; Amirkhan Gurazhev, leader of an IS cell that clashed with Russian special forces in Karabulak, Ingushetia, over two days on 2-3 March; Milos Zujovic, who wounded a security guard at Israel’s Embassy in Serbia on 29 June with a crossbow; the jihadists responsible for the 23 June attack on two churches and two synagogues in Dagestan, Russia; the killers at the Crocus Concert Hall in Moscow on 22 March; and Abdesalem Lassoued, the Tunisian who shot dead two Swedish citizens in Brussels, Belgium, on 16 October 2023.
The full text of the editorial is below.
They Are Us and We Are Them
The bay’a [to the Islamic State] is not so much an organisational bond [or link or connection: arbat] as it is a bond to the deenee shar’iyun (legitimate, legal, or rightful lifeway). Therefore, there are many people among us who were not in our midst. We were not united by administrative ties with them, but we were united with them by Godly creed [or doctrine: aqeeda rabbaniya], jihad, and loyalty [to other Muslims] (wala). They fulfilled their bay’a with their blood and documented their affiliation with their sacrifices. These are us and we are them, no matter how far apart our homes and cities are.
With the escalation of distant attacks in the capitals and upon the embassies of disbelief, we remind you that the Islamic State follows a specific policy in [either] adopting these attacks, or being satisfied with just blessing and praising them, [while continuing] with its painstaking quest and shar’iyun obligation to foment and support them [the attacks] with all ways and means legally available. This is no secret and it is its [IS’s] duty, and from Allah is help and support.
This type of attack, carried out by individual soldiers or supporters who gave bay’a to the Islamic State and responded to the call [or incitement: tahrid] and directives [or instructions: tawjihat] of its emirs and shaykhs, proves the effectiveness of the Islamic State’s discourse [or speeches: khitabat] and its ability to influence the souls of the devout sons of Islam, transcending the barriers of borders, languages, and races.
Self-evidently, these attacks confirm the failure of the global misinformation and distortion campaigns run by the Crusader Coalition, in which preachers, groups, and movements participated and had the largest budgets spent on them. Yet, they did not succeed in distracting Muslim youth from the Islamic State and did not prevent them from responding to the directives of its emirs in accordance with the principle: If they close the door to hijra (emigration or exodus for God’s sake [i.e., to the “Caliphate”]) in your faces, then open the gates of hell upon them in their own homes, and if they prevent you from reaching your home in the Caliphate, then be a brick in its foundation wherever you are and water its plants with the purity of your blood.
The Islamic State has exerted great effort on this jihadist file. It continues to be managed by leaders [or commanders: al-qaqa] and soldiers, military and security officers, and professional media instigators, whose blood and effort have paid off, thanks be to God Almighty, bring blood and bleeding and a mounting terror, continuous and unmistakable, into the heart of the abode of the unbelievers. Between what the Islamic State announces and what it conceals, what is kept secret is greater.
This file is one of the examples of the effectiveness of the Islamic State’s approach to “globalising the jihad” (awlama al-jihad), taking it out of the mire of fighting for country and nationalism, and returning it to its original nature; a pure jihad that transcends all borders imposed on the earth by jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance) and abides by no regulations except the divine law (al-shari’a al-ilahiya) and the Sunnah of the Prophet.
And so, the killing, terror, and security attrition (istinzaf) that threatens to overwhelm the countries of disbelief, their capitals, and their embassies bears the seal of the Islamic State, and is signed and implemented by its soldiers, detachments, supporters, and in general its faithful guardians. This, in turn, provides a clear, practical model for alliances of faith, away from the swamp of jahiliyya and suspicious alliances in which jihadist movements, past and present, have been implicated, leading to comprehensive disasters and inconsistent methodologies that made [former Afghan president Hamid] Karzai and [founder of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Ruhollah] Khomeini acceptable allies!
This is a message to the people of the Islamic State around the world, whether they have been able to join its detachments or have been prevented from doing so by technical obstacles or security issues and, therefore, belong to it by bay’a and wala. We inform you that this [external attacks] is an important aspect of the contemporary jihad to which the Islamic State gives the greatest attention, so you should give it your greatest attention, each in its own way: the ilami (media operative) instigates and stirs stagnant waters, the shar’i (jurist) strengthens and reassures hesitant hearts, and the amni (security or intelligence officer) monitors and directs the individual attackers.1 We reiterate that documenting the action [i.e., filming the terrorist attack], although it is important, should not be a hindrance to its completion. Honesty is sufficient, and following and trusting in God Almighty.
We also draw the attention of Muslims who are watching what is happening without getting involved, and we say to them: life is going by. There are many developments and they are accelerating. Those who do not take the initiative are the same as those who are late. Those searching for safety will only find it in its original places, in the arenas of jihad and aqeeda. The reflective [Muslim] sees areas incinerated one after another against the will of their people, and all imagined interests collapse before this lived reality. The happy person does not prioritise temporary security and comfort over eternal security and comfort.
From another angle, these bold attacks are an important lesson for those working in the field of support [or aid for Muslims: al-munasara]. These heroes [IS’s lone attackers] are among the people most deserving of this honourable description, as they are the ones who truly supported [other Muslims] and demonstrated their support by action. So let the supporters take inspiration from these shining examples of supporters on the prophetic methodology, whose words were few and actions were many, who followed knowledge with action and did not engage in conversation with adversaries, but fought to the death in support of his deen and to uphold the law of his Lord, glory be to Him. They are us and we are them, wherever they are. They have fulfilled their bay’a and documented it with their blood. Is there a bay’a higher than a blood bay’a? For they are the most sincere and fulfilled oaths, the highest and most reliable of bonds. Whoever gives bay’a, let this be [the form of] his bay’a, and let these heroes be his role models.
They are us and we are them. We are united by the bond of aqeeda, brotherhood, and loyalty to the believers. We cooperate with them in righteousness, piety, enmity, and defeating of the infidels, and all of their oaths of allegiance are valid, even if they are captured. May God accept them, fulfil their rewards, and make their jihad a success. Even if their bodies and countries are distant, the brotherhood of the deen brings them so close together it is as if their blood is mixed with the blood of their brothers in the House of the Caliphate and its various provinces. They are us and we are them, and we ask God to gather us and them in the abode of His mercy, for He is the guardian of that and the one capable of it. Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds.
NOTES
The phrase used is “al-aswad al-munfarida”, which literally means “single blacks” or “lone blacks”, i.e., individual carriers of the Islamic State’s Black Standard. As noted a few months ago, this is something of an innovation for IS: “The Islamic State has previously, including recently, used the phrase ‘al-dhiyab al-munfarida’ to mean ‘lone wolves’, but it has always been clear that the group is importing the concept—either directly quoting Westerners, or commenting on the Western fear of these kind of attackers—since IS regards such terrorists (for good reason) as belonging to it, acting physically alone, but usually given orders, and sometimes quite intimately guided through an attack, via online communications.”