Islamic State is Displeased with Syria’s Islamist Ruler Embracing Trump
The main editorial of the 495th edition of Al-Naba, the weekly newsletter of the Islamic State (IS), published on 15 May 2025, was a ferocious attack on Ahmad al-Shara (Abu Muhammad al-Jolani), an IS renegade and the current “interim” president of Syria, who met in Saudi Arabia with U.S. President Donald Trump one day earlier.
BACKGROUND
Al-Shara was the IS operative who led the expedition into Syria in 2011 to set up the IS front group, Jabhat al-Nusra. In 2013, Al-Shara rejected IS’s attempt to assert overt control over him and Al-Nusra, and declared his allegiance to Al-Qaeda. The war between IS and Al-Nusra that erupted at this point has shaped the jihadist movement ever since. In late 2016 and early 2017, Al-Shara took steps that rebranded his organisation as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and publicly severed his connection with Al-Qaeda.
Over the next nearly eight years, in the pocket of northwest Syria centred on Idlib that HTS ruled, the group developed its administrative capacity and Al-Shara purportedly underwent further ideological evolutions away from globalist jihadism. Breaking out of this enclave on 27 November 2024, intending a limited offensive to reshape the situation in the Aleppo countryside, HTS found that the Bashar al-Asad regime had utterly decayed from within. The regime crumbled with barely a fight as HTS marched down to Damascus, and by 8 December Al-Shara was master of Syria.
During the final offensive and since, Al-Shara has spoken in terms designed to appeal to the West. The rhetorical emphasis on stability, humane governance, and counter-terrorism, meaning containing IS, has in some ways manifested more completely than anybody had a right to hope after half-a-century of totalitarianism and fourteen years of civil war. At the same time, Islamist troops under Al-Shara’s command structure carried out a hideous wave of pogroms against the Alawi minority in March, and, though Al-Shara again said all the right things in the aftermath, we have no clarity yet on whether this was a blip or a harbinger.
Nonetheless, the stars seem to have aligned for Al-Shara as Trump is determined to get U.S. troops out of Syria, part of his personal fixation on ending “forever wars” and winning the Nobel Peace Prize, and Trump therefore needs the HTS government to be strong enough to prevent an Afghanistan-style meltdown in the wake of the U.S. withdrawing that would mar his claims that “peace” had been achieved. This was the background to Trump announcing during his trip to Saudi Arabia, to the surprise of his own staff, the lifting of the U.S. sanctions on Syria, and praising Al-Shara as “great” and “a young, attractive guy” with a “very strong past”. Trump has tried to maximise his regional credit by presenting the sanctions-relief as a favour to Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (“MBS”) and Turkey’s ruler, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whom Trump regularly calls a “friend”; both men certainly pressed for this, and were grateful for it, but they must know it would never have happened if Trump did not see self-interest in it.
AL-NABA 495 SUMMARY
The Islamic State, naturally, looks at this picture with contempt—and as vindication of what it has always said about Al-Shara. The main points of the Naba 495 editorial are:
Al-Shara has disgraced himself by throwing himself at Trump’s feet, proving that IS was right all along when it tried to tell people its dispute with Al-Shara was not a mere faction fight, but was based on fundamental creedal differences, between loyalty to Islam and God, and loyalty to democracy and idols like Trump.
This is all of a piece with Al-Shara’s faithless history and, indeed, his defective, power-hungry character is the reason the Americans signed off on Turkey installing him to replace Asad in the first place.
Having turned his back on the shari’a and surrendered all honour, Al-Shara will find himself pressed relentlessly for more concessions to maintain “the approval of America and the Jews”, and Trump has already spelled this out: he wants Al-Shara to normalise relations with Israel—a euphemism for swearing “allegiance to the Jews”—and combat the Islamic State, specifically by keeping the IS prisoners locked up.
The Islamic State takes a somewhat improbable dive into the psychological literature to conclude that Al-Shara will be drawn into serving the infidels more and more by them conditioning further political assistance on him continuously proving his loyalty and delivering benefits, above all by fighting IS. Once the “associative pairing” is in place between “treason” and “reward”, Al-Shara will be as pliable as Ivan Pavlov’s dog.
Al-Shara’s enslavement by the West differs only in being more blatant than the Gulf States and Turkey, none of which have a shred of sovereignty to call their own.
Perhaps the most notable thing in the editorial: IS addresses the foreign fighters in HTS’s ranks, says Al-Shara will betray them by acceding to Trump’s demands that they are expelled from Syria, and invites them to join IS, a calculated call with some history behind it.1
AL-NABA 495 EDITORIAL
Upon Trump’s Doorstep!
[or “Upon Trump’s Threshold!” (Ala atabat Tramb!)]
“The idea is that getting to Trump directly is the best avenue because there are just too many ideologues within the administration to get past.” Thus did one of the Crusaders describe the obstacles that might prevent Al-Jolani from obtaining American approval and winning Trumpian favour.2 Therefore, the solution was to meet Trump and speak him without an interpreter or intermediary, to throw oneself upon his doorstep [or threshold] and abase oneself at his door, a modern idolatry [or paganism: wathaniyya] with a revolutionary flavour, the burden of which was borne by this disgraced one, and in the Land of Revelation [Bilad al-Wahy] during the sacred months!
The grey ones [al-ramadiyyun, i.e., fence-sitters] have long promoted [the idea] that the Islamic State’s dispute with Al-Jolani and his likes was a political, partisan disagreement, not one of methodology [manhaj] and creed [aqeeda]. But today, the truth of the dispute becomes clear, in sound and image: it is between tawhid [monotheism] and shirk [idolatry]!3 Between Islam and democracy! Between those whose master is Muhammad (peace be upon him) and those whose master is Trump. Meeting him [Trump] and pleasing him has become a “historic achievement” celebrated by the “revolutionaries” as they dance in the Umayyad Square under the pretext of lifting American sanctions. But who will lift the sanctions of God?!
In the broader picture of the meeting between Trump and Al-Jolani, nothing is out of place. The pieces of the puzzle are being assembled according to the same design that began with removing Iran from the Syrian scene and then appointing the hyena as successor to Asad, under Turkish-American supervision. It is part of a single package on the table of international deals, bound together by the war on Islam and the protection of international interests.
Politically, there is no doubt that the Saudi and Qatari billions, along with Turkish commitments, convinced Trump to carve out a short moment from his packed schedule to spend with Al-Jolani and grant him a “great opportunity”. The tawaghit of the Gulf had offered their American master many enticing business deals, but what can Al-Jolani, the “young man” who possesses nothing but an obsession with power and a heavy legacy of treachery and betrayal, offer him?
The revolutionaries, and some jihadists along with them, justify Al-Jolani’s past and future concessions as political transactions for the sake of his country’s future, a future that appears to be achievable only through soliciting the approval of America and the Jews. But will they ever be pleased with him? These are losing bargains that Al-Jolani began long before he reached power. True, they granted him the presidency, but they stripped him of his deen [lifeway, Islam] and honour, until his name became a byword for enmity toward the shari’a and honour.
Methodologically, Al-Jolani nullified the Millat Ibrahim [creed of Abraham] and fought against it with all his might. So it is no surprise that he should replace it with the “Abraham Accords”, which aim to reinforce the protective walls around the Jewish statelet and tighten the cords of loyalty to them. This was explicitly clear in the American demands dictated by Trump to Al-Jolani, which are summed up as: allegiance to the Jews under the label of “normalisation,” fighting the Islamic State, and tightening the shackles of its captives in the prisons east of the Euphrates. These are the fundamental conditions under which America allowed Turkey to install Al-Jolani as Asad’s successor. So will Al-Jolani go even further in taking the Jews as allies, or will he content himself with border-protection agreements?!
Let us rewind a little and recall how Al-Jolani used to disparage the Iraqi experience of the Islamic State, saying he did not want to repeat it. Do you understand now what he meant by that? He meant the purest aspect of it, its loyalty [wala], disavowal [bara], and severance [or separation: mufasala]. Indeed, the only fault he found with it was its uncompromising tawhid, its loyalty to the believers, and its disavowal and complete severance from the disbelievers. This is the experience Al-Jolani fled from into the arms of Trump, Macron, Ibn Salman, and Erdogan. “And whoever trades faith for disbelief has certainly strayed from the right path [sawa al-sabil]” [Qur’an 2:108].
Among the American impositions upon Al-Jolani was the removal of the “non-Syrian fighters” who had fought by his side for a long time and were not spared his betrayal. He ultimately managed to dismantle their groups, independent and non-independent alike, and bring to an end their project, which he had long exploited for his own benefit. So we take this opportunity to address these people with a call [or invitation: da’wa], a [piece of] sincere advice, and an excuse before God the Exalted, and say: verily, the leaders of the Islamic State advised you repeatedly and were truthful with their counsel, but you lagged behind and turned away, and now you are paying the price, exactly as they warned you! Yet the invitation is still open to you. Do not allow yourselves to become a card that Al-Jolani burns in pursuit of international approval. What a waste it would be for your journey to Syria [Al-Sham] to end this way. So repent, return, and join the companies [or brigades: saraya] of the Islamic State that are spread among you in the countryside and outskirts [of cities], for whoever knocks on the door shall find an answer.
From another angle, the event reflects the illusion of sovereignty spoken of by the apostate governments, for without international support and approval, they are nothing! Here is Al-Jolani’s civil state, awaiting a glance of mercy from Trump and an opportunity from him. It is total slavery by every measure.
The meeting between Trump and Al-Jolani may grant the latter a chance to atone for his past in jihad and to obtain some political rewards. But that will not be enough. Al-Jolani and his clique will remain at the mercy of American blackmail to [constantly] prove their devotion to the war against jihad. Thus, every political favour they are anticipating will be tied to [fresh] attacks they must wage against the mujahideen or to the delivery of some other benefit to the disbelievers. A condition of associative pairing will arise between “treason” and “reward”, in the manner of Pavlov with the “dog!”, whom he subjected to numerous experiments in his laboratories until he succeeded in controlling its behaviour. So say the studies of “psychology”, upon which the intelligence agencies have based many of their methods.
And while the idolatrous offerings gather at the Trumpian doorstep, the Crusaders gather on the hill of “Dabiq” to search for the remains of their dead, those whom Al-Jolani failed to serve while they were alive, only to now serve them as corpses and fragments of remains. This is why Dabiq remains visible as a setting for the struggle between Islam and disbelief, in defiance of the [will of the] disbelievers and the hypocrites [munafiqun], and the mujahideen are still marching toward it with confident, believing steps, certain of the promise of God the Exalted and the promise of His Messenger.
Once again, events affirm the depth of the Islamic State’s discernment in its judgment upon the methodologies of the [other] groups, far from emotions, ghulu [exaggeration or extremism], and irja [laxity, lit. “postponing (God’s judgment on sinners)”]. So praise God abundantly, O soldiers of the Caliphate, for what He has granted you of His bounty, what He has blessed you with of guidance, and what He has enabled you to do in holding fast to the Book and the Sunna. For this is the success and the achievement that is to be celebrated, and for which blood is to be spilled. So let the world [dunya] and its adornments go, and may your Islam remain intact and your steadfastness upon the path of God, which many have strayed from in a time when a man becomes a believer in the morning and a disbeliever by evening, selling his deen for a portion of this world!4
In conclusion, the taghut Al-Jolani declared after his meeting with Trump that “Syria is a land of peace”, while the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said that it is the land of epic battles [ard al-malahim]. So which of the two promises do you believe?
NOTES
By the time IS publicly tried to bring Al-Nusra to heel in April 2023, it was well-aware that Al-Shara would probably resist, so had prepared the ground by secretly obtaining the loyalty of significant sections of Al-Nusra, and the most receptive category, by far, was the foreign fighters, a huge majority of whom openly defected once IS and Al-Nusra were at daggers drawn. Having the foreigners (and a not-insignificant number of field emirs with their brigades) ripped away gravely weakened Al-Nusra—by some accounts it would not have survived without the assistance of its then-partner Ahrar al-Sham—and Al-Nusra’s operating capacity was crippled for years afterwards, especially in Aleppo, where the foreign-dominated Al-Nusra infrastructure had wholly gone over to IS, and IS had then been ejected by the rebellion.
The number of foreign fighters in HTS is too small at the present time to have the same kind of existential implications as twelve years ago even if they all joined IS tomorrow. But foreigners do still have an importance to HTS out of proportion to their numbers. For instance, HTS relied on an ethnic Albanian faction, Xhemati Alban, for specialised tactical aspects of its final offensive in December, and the faction’s leader, Abdul Jashari (Abu Qatada al-Albani), a close confidante of Al-Shara’s, was among the strategic planners of the whole offensive. Jashari has since been given a senior post in the formal Syrian national army, as have several other foreign jihadists. It would not be nothing for HTS to lose such people, though, obviously, their closeness to Al-Shara and the rewards bestowed on them for their part in his victory make it unlikely they will join IS in the deserts.
In terms of the overall numbers of foreigners in HTS, we have no reliable figures. The figures floating around for HTS foreigners congregate around 5,000, the bulk of them (around 3,500) said to be Chinese Uyghurs from the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), and a majority of the rest Russian speakers. As we also have no reliable figures for HTS’s overall size, it is impossible to say what proportion of HTS’s force the foreigners represent. (Estimates are 10% to 15%, but a lot of dubious assumptions are built in to such estimates.) On the one hand, again, the loyalty of these forces to HTS, built up over many years in the trenches together, and now with victory in hand, makes it very unlikely there will be any mass exodus.
On the other hand, the foreign fighters are perhaps the most extreme cadre in any jihadist theatre. This is true ideologically: these are not people who were forced to take up arms because war came to their village; they made a decision, on the basis of cosmic ideas, to come from half a world away, often leaving comfortable lives, to wage a holy war in which they knew there was a good chance they would die. It is also true operationally: having come for jihad, these are the people who find letting war go most difficult. (This is on average, of course: I met a Chechen foreign fighter in Damascus who was more than happy to settle into family life now the war is over and there will be many such cases.)
Put simply, IS’s appeal is a very calculated one, targeted to the precise demographic where success is most likely, as they have proven before, and even a small number of defections could do outsize damage to HTS, especially if IS recruits them for suicide attacks, which foreign fighters are disproportionately inclined to.
The quote is from Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute.
Shirk more properly means “association”, as in associating something—an object, idea, person—with God, putting this thing on the same level in terms of its worthiness to be worshipped. This is the great crime of the Prophet Muhammad’s primary opponents in the Qur’an, al-mushrikun (the associators). From the text of the Qur’an, it is clear that this is an argument within a community of Biblical monotheists—the Qur’an directly refers to the mushrikun as being part of Muhammad’s own people (43:57)—and one of the crucial points of theology at issue is the status of angels. Muhammad is adamant on angels’ subordination and accuses his rivals of worshipping them as equivalents to God, thus he is accusing them of being “associators” in the way Protestants would later accuse Catholics of being “pagans” in the disputations of the sixteenth century. By the time the exegetic corpus was being put together that forged Islam as we know it, two centuries after Muhammad lived, the polemical context of Muhammad’s use of “mushrikun” was lost, and so the Tradition recorded that he had been arguing with literal pagans.
The allusion is to a hadith in Sahih Muslim, regarded by Sunnis as one of the two most authoritative hadith collections, alongside Sahih al-Bukhari. Written in the mid-ninth century AD, as the canon of orthodox Islamic creed and historiography was crystalising, the Sahihayn claim to be compilations of authentic hadiths, the stories about the sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad and the Companions. The immediate problem for a secular historian is that the criterion for authenticity is a hadith’s purported isnad (chain of (usually oral) transmission), which is a weak and easily corrupted evidentiary basis on its own terms, and all the more so because the Sahihayn were compiled two-hundred years after the Prophet lived. The larger problem is that it is clear from the context in which the hadith arose—the contest for creedal authority between the caliph and the ulema—that isnads were fabricated to burnish the credibility of likewise-invented hadiths that were being used as scriptural weapons. Similarly, in the tug-of-war over Persianate influence in Islam during the Abbasid period, one method of ideological combat was adducing a hadith, with a suspiciously impeccable isnad, to support or reject the importation of a doctrine or practice. There is a strong argument that for a non-Muslim the hadith simply cannot be treated as historical evidence.